I'm reading Mounted Combat in Vietnam again. Which you can find in it's entirety online. Except for the occasional typo it's a very good read.
It basically points out the myth that tanks and AFVs were totally useless in Vietnam's terrain or against the enemy faced. It points out what should be obvious. That mechanized forces can go farther, faster, with more firepower and stay longer then non-mechanized forces. And when trying to hunt down an elusive enemy you really need that. It also points out that much of decision to bring in mostly leg infantry into Vietnam had as much to do with artificial troops limits as it did with misconceptions and ignorance.
One of the most troubling myths that exist today is how 'vulnerable' tanks and more importantly the M113 were to enemy action. Yes, they could be destroyed and yes mines were a huge problem. And yes, people were killed. But how many more soldiers and Marines were killed by booby traps that wouldn't effect an M41 Light tank, M48 MBT or M113? How much more vulnerable were troops moving around Vietnam on foot to mortars, machine guns, grenades and small arms fire then those moving in an APC? And those on foot had less direct firepower available to them and were greatly limited in the amount of ammo they could carry. People obsess of what 'great targets' an APC and tank make because of there size, but they forget that the ONLY protection for those on the ground is to dig a hole and hide. It's kind of hard to close with and destroy the enemy when you're just trying to survive. And there is the last issue, how many more helicopters were shot down then M113s destroyed? How many more people died jumping off and climbing on Helos in a hot LZ?
Yes, the M113 was vulnerable and no, the Army didn't do much to improve it during or even after the war. It wasn't until 1979 that the M113A2 was introduced with improved belly armor. But any way you cut it, they were less vulnerable then their foot-mobile compatriots. And it was a M113-mounts infantry battalion that assaulted through an urban area and took the heavily defended PDF headquarters during Operation Just Cause despite the fact that it was a 'light infantry' operation.
Interesting articles. Made me reflect on some of my own myth-holding.
ReplyDeleteThe constructive critic in me would ask you for some figures and/or some quotes to strengthen what you say. That said don't let it cramp your style, because it works. Challenging the orthodox with some common sense logic, just add a little wine filled humour and somebody to ask you questions and Socrates would be proud.
Very refreshing, and all the best with developing this.
dust off
You do have to look at it with a skeptical eye. It was written at a time when the Army was pushing to convert to a heavy mechanized force. And Gen. Donn Starry was one of the architects of that force. So he's going to dwell on the good.
ReplyDeleteThough it does counter the 'infantry war' mythos (or at least leg infantry war part) of Vietnam. And I think you can get a better perspective on ground combat when reading it. The M113's 'vulnerablity' (and those of most armored vehicles) is usually precieved from the point of the most deadly weapons available on the battlefield. Instead you should look at it from the bottom up instead of top down. You should at all the weapons on the battlefield they do protect from and then ask the question, 'is it enough'. Same with mobility. You don't say that a vehicle is useless because it can't cross some terrain, you look at the terrain it can cross, when it can cross it and ask 'is it enough'.
For the first question, did the M113 have enough protection the answer is likely no. But the Army did little to improve that, far less then it could have and it was better then the nothing that most of the foot-mobile infantry had. As for the terrain it could cover I think the answer was yes, it did cover enough terrain to make it very useful.