Black Hawk Downer

I vaguely remember watching news on and shortly after Oct. 3rd & 4th 1993.  When the book about the incident, Black Hawk Down, came out I remember people telling he that I absolutely HAD to read it.  I didn't.  When the movie of the same name based on the book came out, again I didn't bother to see it.

Then, about 5 years ago I bought the book.  And it took three tries spread over a two year period to finish it.  Why?  It was one of the most depressing things I've ever read.  And yes, I've since bought and watched the film.  A few times.  How could I find it depressing you ask?  It's a story of heroics and of the US Military flexing it's muscle, is it not?  Which is usually followed by someone make excuses or trying to place the blame.  But to me it's one thing.  I would say it was a black eye.  A failure that haunts this nation to today. 

Somalia is still a trouble spot, long after America's military pulled out (1994) and long after it's nemesis, the warlord Farah Aideed died (1996).  Fighting continues and the Transitional Government is having trouble stabilizing the country, even with the help of (a pitifully small) force of African Union troops.  And there might be some questions to the quality and usefulness of the AU troops.  Then there is the Piracy, which has become famous over the last few years.  But as the Kenyan Foreign Minister points out, Piracy starts on land.  There there have been changes since the US sent in the Marines in December 1992.  The nation was torn between clan warlords.  Now most of the fighting is between the Transitional Government and Bin Laden-inspired Islamist groups.  And among those groups as well.  And you can't forget Western-back Ethiopian invasions. 

But back to US involvement.  When the US, and allies, went it in they took a fairly large force back up with armored vehicles.  This force was able to quickly restore so order and allow relief supplies to start moving again.  Though US Military-Political leadership became quickly bored with the mission and wished for the UN to take over, but on US terms but with minimal US assistance.  The UN force that took over in May was smaller and the US combat element was a very small part of the 10th Mountain Division, though this forces was ill equipped for the mission.  (Even though in theory the mid-80s Light Infantry Divisions were designed rapidly deploy for these kinds of 'contengency operations', reality showed them wholly unprepared and woefully under-equipped for any such thing).  This hastily organized and poorly equipped relief force emboldened General Aideed, who's forces would ambush a group of Pakistani soldier on June 5, killing 24, mutilating many of them.  The US responded by relying on firepower alone.  First attacking a Aideed's arms depots and radio station with AC-130 gunships, then attack a building thought to house Aideed with helicopter gunships.  This second attack did nothing but kill some of Aideed's clan members and enrage many locals.  Aideed's faction retaliated by detonating an IED which killed for US Army MPs. 
Then they sent in TF Ranger thinking a very small group of elite light infantry and SOF troops would fair better.  Six weeks later TF Ranger managed nothing but embarrassing itself and pissing off the locals even more.  Several times a day they would fly over Modadisu very lowly in an effort to 'desensitized' the locals.  The it had the opposite effect.  The combination of the massive noise pollution day and night from the helicopters and the fact that the Rangers were doing nothing practical to help the situation on the ground enraged the locals that weren't already on Aideed's side. So when TF Ranger went to grab two of Aideed's  lieutenants from the Olympic Hotel on Oct. 3rd stage was set for a battle that would kill 18 US troops, wound a further 57 and see one capture.  And only armored vehicles provided by Pakistan and Malaysia would help save total disaster.  US forces would be completely out of Somalia by early 1994.  And things are still be as bad there. 

Total failure.  Even worse while the US Army transitioned to the new Brigade 'Unit of Action' modular design they increased the number of Light Infantry through an increass in the number of  'Infantry BCTs'.  Even these, the children of the 80's LIDs are no better equipped then their Reagan-era predecessors proved to be for that last 25 years.  No mobility, no protection, no firepower, but they take up fewer personnel slots so they fill the same 'filler' roll to make the Army look bigger on paper.