Army Vice Chief Chiarelli on Equipment and Force Structure...

Over on the National Defense Magazine Blog they had a feature about Army Vice Chief-of-Staff General Peter Chiarelli talking about the sweeping review of Army Procurment needs and said some interesting things about the Army's Forces Structure moving forword.

The first part was about how some programs will be cancelled because the lack of a clear need when you have either equipment that can perform the same function currently available or which other programs being developed greatly overlap.  He also talked about speeding up the development process and making it more flexible.  As well as the fact that the Army might not be getting it's money's worth when it comes to PGMs.  I would say it's about time, but I'll believe the changes when I see them.  More interesting to me was what he said about the Army's possible Force Structure moving forward.

A major determinant in how much equipment the Army will acquire in the future is a possible return to the division-based organization. When the Army was made over six years ago from a division- to a brigade-based structure, equipment demand soared because each brigade had to be outfitted with enough vehicles and aircraft. Now the Army is reconsidering the modular brigade makeup simply because it is too expensive to maintain and in some cases there are not enough resources to supply every brigade, Chiarelli said.

The Army will have 158,000 Humvee trucks by 2012, and it is not clear why such a high number is needed, Chiarelli said. “A lot of that [growth in the Humvee fleet] had to do with moving to a modular force,” he said. It has now become clear that the modular force is “not as efficient as a division-based force when it comes to equipment,” he explained. Whereas in a division, equipment can be allocated to units based on need, “When you break into brigades, you have to provide the capability to each and every one of the brigades.”

The Army Training and Doctrine Command is expected to offer recommendations over the next six to nine months for possibly doing away or partially modifying the modular brigade structure, Chiarelli said. “I’m not telegraphing any changes we’re going to make,” he said. But after six years of combat experience with the modular brigades, it’s time to “take a look,” said Chiarelli. But he insisted that the changeover to modular brigades six years ago was not a mistake. “The success of modularization should be questioned by anyone. … I don’t believe we could have done what we did [in Iraq and Afghanistan] with the division structure.”

He obviously likes a division-based Force Structure.  And for all that been said about the modular BCTs it was the division structure that succeeded in Iraq from late-March and April of 2003.  And yes, the BCTs have expanded HQes which always seems to drive up the need for a Humvee for "everyone that is anyone".  The extra vehicles, the drives needed to operate them, as well as the maintainers, the vehicles they in turn need and the fuel and  supplies all of the above need increase the logistics burden and unwanted non-combat overhead for combat units.  And I'm sure Mike Sparks is somewhere having visions of driving over the 'excess' HMMWVs in a M113 and crushing them monster-truck style. 

But that doesn't get the the heart of the reason to go from a division-based force to a brigade-based force.  First and foremost was the idea of deployabilty.  Smaller units can deploy faster than larger units.  It's just that simple.  Even though you might need a division (or several divisions) for a task, rapid deployment of a brigade-sized unit has far more of a 'feel-good' element to it then waiting for the division to move into place.  Or doing the hard work of figuring out how to move divisions faster.  Second was the idea that technology would free us from having to have large units altogher and wars could be fought and won faster and with fewer people (and absolutely no messy post-conflict phase).  Last, but most importantly, because the US Army simply lacks the active duty combat units it needs.  Fourty-Two will always be a bigger number then Ten and it will always sound more impressive to say you have 42 of something rather then 10.  The former being the original number of BCTs that were authorized when the previous shift occured (there are now 45, even though 48 were promised when the plan was revised) and the latter is the number of divisions in the Army when the US invaded Iraq. 

Yes, the US had 10 divisions.  And yes, that was fewer then the 18 it had in 1989.  But the cuts went deeper then that.  First that went were the National Guard 'Round-Out' Brigades and Battalions.  Not a terrible loss.  US Forces in Dester Shield/Storm deployed without them.  But that did leave a hole in the Force Structure greater in size then two divisions.  Then the eliminations of the 10th Battalion in each division.  Because many units relied on the NG Round-Out for this the effect was only about 2/3 of a division of combat power.  Then the reduction of mechanized and armored battalions from 4 companies each to three companies each.  In a single move the Army knocked off 25% of its remaining heavy combat force.  And of course 8 divisions and 3 Brigade-sized units were eliminated.  Though to offset this somewhat 15 Brigades of the National Guard were designated "Enhances Readiness Brigades" to be available to deploy when (not if) the undersized Active force became overused or overstretched.  Fifteen Brigades (the eqivilant of 5 divisions) of the likewise reduced National Guard that would be need in the US in case of major natural disaster, in case of major terrorist attack or major civil unrest.  That doesn't even count one of the National Guards other major roles, to be the Strategic Reserve incase a Major Conflict does break out.  That role is even more important when large portions of the Active duty Army are spread around the Globe.

It's simple, the Army's Force Structure was too small.  And the BCT shell game hasn't improve matters much.  While Force Reduction was inevitable after the end of the Cold War, it was to much, too soon.  And it ignored the fact that the Army had been using NG units as filler.  The Army was only big enough to fight the Soviets in Europe only when countnig the whole Army, all of the National Guard, the Reserves and the land forces of our NATO allies.  And confused the Reagan-Era Phony buildup as an actual increase in strength.  (Many of the units in the 'new' divisions were never activated before Force Reduction began). 

Though I doubt any of this will be rectified in the foreseeable future.  The Anti-Military Left wants to reduce the military to the point where it "can't hurt anyone".  The Neocons belivee in the RMA, which basically means a small, weak ground force supported by massive firepower deliever from Air and Sea.  They believe this is somehow faster and cheaper, which makes them think the US can fight more wars to 'reshape' the World in their image.  Liberal Hawks mistakingly believe that a smaller, weaker ground force is just the kind of  'kinder & gentler' and more PR-friendly  force they crave for interventions.  They don't realized that such a force is nothing more then a soft, easy target for the same thugs that are casing whatever problems or humanitary crisis the Liberal Hawks wish to rectify.  And of course the economy is total crap right now and doesn't show signs of getting better soon.