Missing the Point on the 'Kill Squad'

In case you missed it several soldiers are charged with murdering several Afghan civilians over about a 4 month period last year.

Well, an article in the Christian Science Monitor brings up hashish use and implies the two are connected.

The reports that US soldiers accused of plotting and then killing innocent civilians in Afghanistan smoked hashish have sparked concerns among US military officials about how often other US troops may use illegal drugs as well.  

---------

In the wake of these reports, US officials also continue to grapple with ongoing concerns about the extent to which US commanders in the unit were aware of or could have prevented the troubling crimes that US troops are accused of committing.

Hashish use is likely a problem, but it's not THE problem that caused the killings.  The killings were uncovered in a totally separate illegal drug use investigation into the platoon who's members performed the killings.  And nothing I've read indicates that the hash users were the killers.  In fact the Army had ignored the father of one of the soldiers now charged with the murders when his son told him about the first killing in an online chat and he tried to warn Army officials. 

The problem was that a Staff Sergeant who had served two tours in Iraq decided it would be a good idea to kill Afghan civilians for sport, recruited members of his squad and platoon into it and thought he could get away with it. And to say 'drug use made these soldiers think it was OK' is total BULLSHIT!  There are some people who you simply can't trust with loaded weapons around foreign civilians.  And they shouldn't be in the military.  The failure is that the Army and Marines both fail to sort these people out ahead of time and have a very hard time dealing with these things when they happen.  The military needs to find a new way to deal with this because it's obvious that the various chains-of-command are unwilling and unable to deal with this at the proper time and in the proper way.  And part of the problem is that the UCMJ doesn't differentiate between criminal and disciplinary problems.  Telling a Gunny to 'Eff Off', showing up late, going to places considered 'off limits' or generally being a screw-up are disciplinary problems.  Stealing, raping and killing are CRIMINAL problems and the MPs should be brought in first thing no matter what the command might think.  If someone steals over $1,000 out of another Marines' checking account the command of the thief shouldn't tell them 'just pay it back' and sweep it under the rug.  Even if the stolen from is not part of the same unit and has the reputation of being a undisciplined screw up.

Personnel Inefficencies...

I hope that JFCOM goes by-by because it's an empty suit that has no purpose.  The money and personnel used to keep it going can be and should be used elsewhere.  Or it should be sacrificed so cuts DON'T have to come from where they can be least afforded. 

Another way to cut personnel, included the ones you have to deploy, would be to rework the way the Army and Marines do administration.  Instead of individual units have admit shops you combine all on a per-duty station basis.  Assign on Admin Clerk per company under the 1stSgt as a go-between and have all the work done by more efficient centralized Admin shops who can do what they do in large FOBs in Iraq and Afghanistan just as well as they could w/o leaving CONUS.  Likewise totally eliminate the position of G-1/S-1.  They are no longer needed.

I would cut the Artillery Regimental HQ and Assault Amphibian Battalion (including 1CAB) out of the Marine Corps.  They are not tactical or operational commands.  They are purely administrative but they have all the trappings of tactical/operational commands.  I would still have a Regimental Commanding Officer, but his job would be to ensure that the regiment's battalions have the training they need, the equipment they need, that the equipment is in a good state of maintenance and to help the Division HQ to both plan operations and co-ordinate operations.  For this the Artillery Regimental 'Commander' would need an operations officer to help the planning and co-ordination, a Regimental Training officer and  Regimental Maintenance Warrant Officer.  Any 'regimental assets' that are truly needed can be pushes down to the battalions.  The Regimental CO would retain the authority needed to insure the battalions under his command are war-ready, the regimental CO doesn't need a bloated staff to do it.  Likewise the AAV Battalion HQ could likewise be reduced and the battalion commanders would be to each division the same as the artillery regiment's commander.  I would also go looking for units that likewise could go through this transformation.  You would be surprised the personnel you could save by doing this. 

I would also do completely away with one marine unit in particular.  CommCo, H&S Battalion, 3rd FSSG.  The FSSG already has a WHOLE Comm Battalion under its command (in this case 7th Comm Bn) that could provide all the communications support the FSSG HQ needs, there is no need for a separate Comm company.

Gates wants Marine Corps to head in wrong Direction...

Nothing in the world gets me more pissed off on the insistence the the Marine Corps should be 'light' and should do away with it's heavy equipment.  It's really a simple concept.  Helicopters are very limited can only carry so much.  Large cargo planes can carry more, but there are limits.  These limits DO NOT APPLY to ship-borne units.  They can bring extremely heavy equipment right up to the beach.

Yet it doesn't surprise me at all that Gates or the rest of the tools in Washington want to strip the Marines of the Heavy Equipment. 

In a speech in San Francisco, Gates spoke of “anxiety” over the future role of the service after nearly a decade of fighting on land in Afghanistan and Iraq. He said some feel the Corps has “become too heavy, too removed from their expeditionary, amphibious roots and the unique skill sets those missions require.” Though many Marines are battle-tested, some “may never have stepped aboard a ship.”

Even the commentator at ModernMarineCorps.com doesn't understand...

Marines deployed aboard Navy ships remain the go-to ready forces in a crisis. Unlike the Army, they are lightly equipped to move quickly ashore by sea or air to conduct evacuations, relief operations or initiate combat. Traditionally the first in, they also are usually the first out, replaced after a few weeks by heavier Army troops trained for the long haul.

No, no, no.  The Marines usually ARE NOT quickly replaces and they DO have heavy equip of their own.  STOP trying to make the Marines sound like the total failure 1980s Light Infantry Divisions. 

But Gates doesn't seem to understand that the force he thinks the Marines should be is far from the force he says is needed to be...

That “unique ability to project combat forces from the sea under uncertain circumstances — forces quickly able to protect and sustain themselves — is a capability that America has needed in this past decade and will require in the future,” Gates said.

No heavy equipment, no tanks, no AAVs, no LAVs, no artillery, getting arid of all the weapons that would make the Marines 'lighter' would make the Marines COMPLETELY UNABLE to protect and sustain themselves, much less fight and fight-to-win.  Have we totally forgotten the abject failure of TF Ranger in Somalia?  They were completely completely trapped, completely out numbers and would have been totally screwed if it wasn't for Pakistani tanks and Malay AFVs.  These were America's supposed Super Soldiers.  And they were less then 5 miles from the surf-zone.  How would a 'lighter' Marine Corps fair any better?  It wouldn't.  What Gates proposes, what several others have proposed since the end of the Cold War would do absolutely nothing but lose battles and get Marines killed needlessly.  Gates I guess wasn't happy with one Black Hawk Down.  He wants the Marines to repeat the experience every where they go.

And why does the Marines always end up playing the role of 'second land army'?  Because the first land Army never has enough active duty troops to fulfill the mission.  And their light infantry units are usually too poorly equipped, on account of their lightness, to do what the Marines do. 

NDM doesn't like My Comments...

For a while I've tried to post comments over at National Defense Magazine with no luck.  I think I've been blocked for a while. 

Well, on their blog they had an article about retired Major General Robert Scales' concerns that the US Military isn't as 'dominate' on land then it is in the Air on at Sea.  My comments (rants) are a such...

The reason that our ground forces aren't as 'dominant' as the AF and Navy is because of the old, tired 'superior firepower' BS we've heard since Vietnam.  The difference is they call it the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' now (new packaging, new electronics, same failed philosophy).  We simply don't give small ground combat units the mobility and firepower to be dominant. 

M8 AGS was canceled 15 years ago.  Instead teh Army decided to rely on the TOW-armed armored Humvee for direct firepower for light units.  It lacks the mobile and protection of the M8 and the TOW missile both costs more per round, has a slower rate of fire and the gunner is exposed both when firing the weapon and when reloading it. 

The Army and Marines don't deploy a pair of self-propelled 120mm to each company.  The AR-15 family of weapons not only haven't been replaces with more reliable weapons (such as the HK 416), they are still mass produced (100,000 M4s bought in FY2010).  The Army has never deployed the EFOGM, but instead obsesses with the ultra-expensive NLOS-LS, which likely never see service because of it's huge costs.  The Army is reluctant to give it's squads more firepower by buying them weapons like the M32 6-shot Grenade Launcher.  But they do waste money on weapons like the XM307 25mm Auto Grenade Launcher (that can also be turned into a .50cal).  The Army and Marines REFUSE to understand that these weapons are totally impractical except when mounted on a vehicle.  It doesn't matter how light you make the weapon, the AMMO is the weightily PROBLEM.

Almost all of the things the could increase the fighting power of small units, the M8, the HK416, the M32 and numerous other things all have one thing in common.  They either started or completely developed by the industry.  And if anything the top-heavy, from-the-top-down orientated DoD absolutely hates is wasn't-invented-here innovations.  They rather have nothing then something that was someone else's idea.  And that's why the US isn't as 'dominant' on land as it is at sea and in the air.

On the Lighter Side...

I can't be all serious and do have to take time away from my rants...

My thoughts on Tea Bagger Christine O'Donnell, would-be Senator of Delaware.

She's a Witch!

Edit:  Watch out, she'll turn you into a Newt!

And we can't forget about the legacy of the previous President, George W. Bush...

Hercubush

JFCOM: Let It Die

Today senators grilled senior DoD officials about the closer of JFCOM.  I say they should save their breath.  The command has been nothing more then a bloated cheerleader for failed RMA policies and phony 'Transformation'.

It, like the policies it espoused, were made for a kind of war the US isn't likely going to fight.  The US isn't going to fight a 1970-80 Soviet-style military in open terrain.  The US got lucky when it was able to beat up on a Poor Man's version in the Southern Iraqi and Kuwaiti Desert in 1991.  The US will likely fight wars either against insurgent/guerilla forces like it did in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan or fight a military who will use difficult terrain (cities, mountains, forests, jungles) and non-linear tactics to offset the US' technological advantage.  Unfortunately JFCOM has only ever focused on re-fighting either Desert Storm or notional 'indirect firepower dominance' that failed for weak foot-mobile infantry in Vietnam and continues to fail in Afghanistan.

Black Hawk Downer

I vaguely remember watching news on and shortly after Oct. 3rd & 4th 1993.  When the book about the incident, Black Hawk Down, came out I remember people telling he that I absolutely HAD to read it.  I didn't.  When the movie of the same name based on the book came out, again I didn't bother to see it.

Then, about 5 years ago I bought the book.  And it took three tries spread over a two year period to finish it.  Why?  It was one of the most depressing things I've ever read.  And yes, I've since bought and watched the film.  A few times.  How could I find it depressing you ask?  It's a story of heroics and of the US Military flexing it's muscle, is it not?  Which is usually followed by someone make excuses or trying to place the blame.  But to me it's one thing.  I would say it was a black eye.  A failure that haunts this nation to today. 

Somalia is still a trouble spot, long after America's military pulled out (1994) and long after it's nemesis, the warlord Farah Aideed died (1996).  Fighting continues and the Transitional Government is having trouble stabilizing the country, even with the help of (a pitifully small) force of African Union troops.  And there might be some questions to the quality and usefulness of the AU troops.  Then there is the Piracy, which has become famous over the last few years.  But as the Kenyan Foreign Minister points out, Piracy starts on land.  There there have been changes since the US sent in the Marines in December 1992.  The nation was torn between clan warlords.  Now most of the fighting is between the Transitional Government and Bin Laden-inspired Islamist groups.  And among those groups as well.  And you can't forget Western-back Ethiopian invasions. 

But back to US involvement.  When the US, and allies, went it in they took a fairly large force back up with armored vehicles.  This force was able to quickly restore so order and allow relief supplies to start moving again.  Though US Military-Political leadership became quickly bored with the mission and wished for the UN to take over, but on US terms but with minimal US assistance.  The UN force that took over in May was smaller and the US combat element was a very small part of the 10th Mountain Division, though this forces was ill equipped for the mission.  (Even though in theory the mid-80s Light Infantry Divisions were designed rapidly deploy for these kinds of 'contengency operations', reality showed them wholly unprepared and woefully under-equipped for any such thing).  This hastily organized and poorly equipped relief force emboldened General Aideed, who's forces would ambush a group of Pakistani soldier on June 5, killing 24, mutilating many of them.  The US responded by relying on firepower alone.  First attacking a Aideed's arms depots and radio station with AC-130 gunships, then attack a building thought to house Aideed with helicopter gunships.  This second attack did nothing but kill some of Aideed's clan members and enrage many locals.  Aideed's faction retaliated by detonating an IED which killed for US Army MPs. 
Then they sent in TF Ranger thinking a very small group of elite light infantry and SOF troops would fair better.  Six weeks later TF Ranger managed nothing but embarrassing itself and pissing off the locals even more.  Several times a day they would fly over Modadisu very lowly in an effort to 'desensitized' the locals.  The it had the opposite effect.  The combination of the massive noise pollution day and night from the helicopters and the fact that the Rangers were doing nothing practical to help the situation on the ground enraged the locals that weren't already on Aideed's side. So when TF Ranger went to grab two of Aideed's  lieutenants from the Olympic Hotel on Oct. 3rd stage was set for a battle that would kill 18 US troops, wound a further 57 and see one capture.  And only armored vehicles provided by Pakistan and Malaysia would help save total disaster.  US forces would be completely out of Somalia by early 1994.  And things are still be as bad there. 

Total failure.  Even worse while the US Army transitioned to the new Brigade 'Unit of Action' modular design they increased the number of Light Infantry through an increass in the number of  'Infantry BCTs'.  Even these, the children of the 80's LIDs are no better equipped then their Reagan-era predecessors proved to be for that last 25 years.  No mobility, no protection, no firepower, but they take up fewer personnel slots so they fill the same 'filler' roll to make the Army look bigger on paper. 

Reading Mounted Combat in Vietnam...

I'm reading Mounted Combat in Vietnam again.  Which you can find in it's entirety online.  Except for the occasional typo it's a very good read.

It basically points out the myth that tanks and AFVs were totally useless in Vietnam's terrain or against the enemy faced.  It points out what should be obvious.  That mechanized forces can go farther, faster, with more firepower and stay longer then non-mechanized forces.  And when trying to hunt down an elusive enemy you really need that.  It also points out that much of decision to bring in mostly leg infantry into Vietnam had as much to do with artificial troops limits as it did with misconceptions and ignorance. 

One of the most troubling myths that exist today is how 'vulnerable' tanks and more importantly the M113 were to enemy action.  Yes, they could be destroyed and yes mines were a huge problem.  And yes, people were killed.  But how many more soldiers and Marines were killed by booby traps that wouldn't effect an M41 Light tank, M48 MBT or M113?  How much more vulnerable were troops moving around Vietnam on foot to mortars, machine guns, grenades and small arms fire then those moving in an APC?  And those on foot had less direct firepower available to them and were greatly limited in the amount of ammo they could carry.  People obsess of what 'great targets' an APC and tank make because of there size, but they forget that the ONLY protection for those on the ground is to dig a hole and hide.  It's kind of hard to close with and destroy the enemy when you're just trying to survive.  And there is the last issue, how many more helicopters were shot down then M113s destroyed?  How many more people died jumping off and climbing on Helos in a hot LZ? 

Yes, the M113 was vulnerable and no, the Army didn't do much to improve it during or even after the war.  It wasn't until 1979 that the M113A2 was introduced with improved belly armor.  But any way you cut it, they were less vulnerable then their foot-mobile compatriots.  And it was a M113-mounts infantry battalion that assaulted through an urban area and took the heavily defended PDF headquarters during Operation Just Cause despite the fact that it was a 'light infantry' operation.

Army Vice Chief Chiarelli on Equipment and Force Structure...

Over on the National Defense Magazine Blog they had a feature about Army Vice Chief-of-Staff General Peter Chiarelli talking about the sweeping review of Army Procurment needs and said some interesting things about the Army's Forces Structure moving forword.

The first part was about how some programs will be cancelled because the lack of a clear need when you have either equipment that can perform the same function currently available or which other programs being developed greatly overlap.  He also talked about speeding up the development process and making it more flexible.  As well as the fact that the Army might not be getting it's money's worth when it comes to PGMs.  I would say it's about time, but I'll believe the changes when I see them.  More interesting to me was what he said about the Army's possible Force Structure moving forward.

A major determinant in how much equipment the Army will acquire in the future is a possible return to the division-based organization. When the Army was made over six years ago from a division- to a brigade-based structure, equipment demand soared because each brigade had to be outfitted with enough vehicles and aircraft. Now the Army is reconsidering the modular brigade makeup simply because it is too expensive to maintain and in some cases there are not enough resources to supply every brigade, Chiarelli said.

The Army will have 158,000 Humvee trucks by 2012, and it is not clear why such a high number is needed, Chiarelli said. “A lot of that [growth in the Humvee fleet] had to do with moving to a modular force,” he said. It has now become clear that the modular force is “not as efficient as a division-based force when it comes to equipment,” he explained. Whereas in a division, equipment can be allocated to units based on need, “When you break into brigades, you have to provide the capability to each and every one of the brigades.”

The Army Training and Doctrine Command is expected to offer recommendations over the next six to nine months for possibly doing away or partially modifying the modular brigade structure, Chiarelli said. “I’m not telegraphing any changes we’re going to make,” he said. But after six years of combat experience with the modular brigades, it’s time to “take a look,” said Chiarelli. But he insisted that the changeover to modular brigades six years ago was not a mistake. “The success of modularization should be questioned by anyone. … I don’t believe we could have done what we did [in Iraq and Afghanistan] with the division structure.”

He obviously likes a division-based Force Structure.  And for all that been said about the modular BCTs it was the division structure that succeeded in Iraq from late-March and April of 2003.  And yes, the BCTs have expanded HQes which always seems to drive up the need for a Humvee for "everyone that is anyone".  The extra vehicles, the drives needed to operate them, as well as the maintainers, the vehicles they in turn need and the fuel and  supplies all of the above need increase the logistics burden and unwanted non-combat overhead for combat units.  And I'm sure Mike Sparks is somewhere having visions of driving over the 'excess' HMMWVs in a M113 and crushing them monster-truck style. 

But that doesn't get the the heart of the reason to go from a division-based force to a brigade-based force.  First and foremost was the idea of deployabilty.  Smaller units can deploy faster than larger units.  It's just that simple.  Even though you might need a division (or several divisions) for a task, rapid deployment of a brigade-sized unit has far more of a 'feel-good' element to it then waiting for the division to move into place.  Or doing the hard work of figuring out how to move divisions faster.  Second was the idea that technology would free us from having to have large units altogher and wars could be fought and won faster and with fewer people (and absolutely no messy post-conflict phase).  Last, but most importantly, because the US Army simply lacks the active duty combat units it needs.  Fourty-Two will always be a bigger number then Ten and it will always sound more impressive to say you have 42 of something rather then 10.  The former being the original number of BCTs that were authorized when the previous shift occured (there are now 45, even though 48 were promised when the plan was revised) and the latter is the number of divisions in the Army when the US invaded Iraq. 

Yes, the US had 10 divisions.  And yes, that was fewer then the 18 it had in 1989.  But the cuts went deeper then that.  First that went were the National Guard 'Round-Out' Brigades and Battalions.  Not a terrible loss.  US Forces in Dester Shield/Storm deployed without them.  But that did leave a hole in the Force Structure greater in size then two divisions.  Then the eliminations of the 10th Battalion in each division.  Because many units relied on the NG Round-Out for this the effect was only about 2/3 of a division of combat power.  Then the reduction of mechanized and armored battalions from 4 companies each to three companies each.  In a single move the Army knocked off 25% of its remaining heavy combat force.  And of course 8 divisions and 3 Brigade-sized units were eliminated.  Though to offset this somewhat 15 Brigades of the National Guard were designated "Enhances Readiness Brigades" to be available to deploy when (not if) the undersized Active force became overused or overstretched.  Fifteen Brigades (the eqivilant of 5 divisions) of the likewise reduced National Guard that would be need in the US in case of major natural disaster, in case of major terrorist attack or major civil unrest.  That doesn't even count one of the National Guards other major roles, to be the Strategic Reserve incase a Major Conflict does break out.  That role is even more important when large portions of the Active duty Army are spread around the Globe.

It's simple, the Army's Force Structure was too small.  And the BCT shell game hasn't improve matters much.  While Force Reduction was inevitable after the end of the Cold War, it was to much, too soon.  And it ignored the fact that the Army had been using NG units as filler.  The Army was only big enough to fight the Soviets in Europe only when countnig the whole Army, all of the National Guard, the Reserves and the land forces of our NATO allies.  And confused the Reagan-Era Phony buildup as an actual increase in strength.  (Many of the units in the 'new' divisions were never activated before Force Reduction began). 

Though I doubt any of this will be rectified in the foreseeable future.  The Anti-Military Left wants to reduce the military to the point where it "can't hurt anyone".  The Neocons belivee in the RMA, which basically means a small, weak ground force supported by massive firepower deliever from Air and Sea.  They believe this is somehow faster and cheaper, which makes them think the US can fight more wars to 'reshape' the World in their image.  Liberal Hawks mistakingly believe that a smaller, weaker ground force is just the kind of  'kinder & gentler' and more PR-friendly  force they crave for interventions.  They don't realized that such a force is nothing more then a soft, easy target for the same thugs that are casing whatever problems or humanitary crisis the Liberal Hawks wish to rectify.  And of course the economy is total crap right now and doesn't show signs of getting better soon.

Transformers, less then meets the Eye...

The HMMWV.  A light truck that was never meant to anything but run around the safe 'rear areas' of the linear battlefield that was disappearing by the end of World War Two.  In training areas within CONUS it is a wonders and useful thing.  In areas were people might actually shoot at it or attack it in any way it's a casualty producer for those stuck with no other kind of transport.

The Helicopter.  It became the wonder weapon of the Vietnam War even though large numbers were lost and even more people were lost with them.  In the conflicts since it's still managed to maintain some of it's mystique even though it is no less vulnerable then it was 40 years ago. 

So what does DARPA want to do?  Combine both into a flying truck and call it a Transformer.  Take the vulnerable, yet cheap Humvee and make it considerably more expensive and even more vulnerable.  Take it from easy to operate and maintain (as long as no weapons of any kind get anywhere close to it) and remake it into a complicated nightmare.

The vehicle's designers say it could offer several key advantages with the ability to avoid improvised explosive devices, chief among them. The vehicle would allow troops to hop over roadside bombs simply by flying above them. And while the vehicle would not posses nearly the amount of armor current vehicles do since it must be light to fly, it would still offer protection against most small-arms fire.

The problem with IEDs isn't avoiding the ones you know are there, it's SURVIVING the ones you DON'T know are there. 

There is another huge problem.  The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, who's flying performance is similar to what the DARPA wants with it's Transformer (their term, not mine), has a combat weight of 5,200lb.  The average unarmored weighs between 5,200lb and 5,900lb.  And that's empty.  The M1114 Uparmored Humvee weighs 9,800lb empty and with a max weight of 12,100lb.

This vehicle will solve nothing.  It will be vulnerable on the ground because it will still be lightly armored and it will be weighed down by aircraft components.  It will be vulnerable in the air because it will be slow and likely have poor maneuverability.  A prime target for RPGs.  Just another way the DARPA is working it's magic by taking US Taxpayer dollars and making them disappear.

Why the name?

Why is this blog named E-4 And Below?  All I could think of at the time.

"Tanks" episode on Weaponology...

I watched this for the first time on the Military Channel.  Most Weaponology episodes are about 10 minutes of paid programming for whatever new, futuristic and expensive weapon system the US military is developing (or was when these programs were produced).  And the rest is history about the subject.  Some of it good and informative.  Some of it bad.  And with the episode about Tanks, well, some of it just perpetuating falsehoods the US Army has wrapped itself in.

Most of these falsehoods revolve around Germany's use of tanks in WW2 and their "proper" usage.  They went as far as to quote German General Heinz Guderian several times, but I wonder if any of these people ever read his book.  Or if they bothered to look at the CONTEXT in which Guderian was working.  They also ignore the fact that latter in the war, when Guderian was no longer a field commander, but Chief of Staff his feelings about the proper deployment moderated somewhat.  He became the man that advocated for Tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles to be included in all divisions rather than the commander at Sedan in 1940 who didn't ferry tanks across the Meuse on the first night to support the infantry because he wanted to keep the integrity of his armored units.  But the US Army prefers Guderian the Purist over Guderian the Pragmatist. 

The Context.  In World War One German infantry adapted to the battlefield much better than Anglo-French (including US) forces.  They developed new weapons and new tactics.  The combination is known to us as Stormtroop tactics.  Sometimes it's simply referred to as 'infultration' tactics, but that's a gross oversimplification.  They launched three major offensives in 1918, each one failed to win the war.  The reason wasn't tactics, but the lack of mobility to exploit these breakthroughs and the general state of war exhaustion in the German Empire.  This was Guderian's point of reference when he began working on Panzer tactics.  To him the tank wasn't the breakthrough weapon, but the weapon to exploit the breach in the enemies front line made by the infantry.  To the Allies the tank was the breakthrough AND exploitation weapon.  His one of his favorite quotes being that the Engine of the Panzer was as much of a weapon as it's main gun.  The engine meant mobility and the German Army in 1939 was anything but mobile.

Why the obsession in concentrating his Panzers in a fairly small number of units at the beginning of the war?  There were several reasons.  First and foremost, the average unit of the German Army through out World War Two was the Infantry Division.  And a very high number of these divisions still used horses for transport and to tow artillery.  Just as they had done in World War One.  Just as they had done for centuries.  German industry simply didn't have the production capacity to produce all the vehicles needed.  On the other hand horses were plentiful as were the veterinarians needed to keep them healthy and moving.  This means the vast majority of units in the German Army suffered from the same lack of mobility that hampered their fathers' units in World War One.  There were very few fully motorized Infantry divisions in the German army from 1939 to 1941.  The second reason, as with the first, has to do with that same lack of production capacity.  There were two few Panzers in the German Army.  So spreading them around would have been counterproductive.  Third was was the kind of Panzers available.  Most in 1939 and 1940 were the Pz I and Pz II.  These tanks were small, light weight and were meant to be nothing more then training tanks to be replace before war broke out.  They were thinly armored and were equipped with medium machine guns at worst.  At best they had 20mm heavy machine guns.  Few of the larger Pz III and Pz IV were available.  And the former too would find itself obsolete very quickly (as with the Czech built Pz 35(t) and Pz 38(t)).  So to make up for the tanks individual weaknesses they were to be used en masse.  And to be used to outmaneuver rather than outfight their enemies whenever possible.  Later in the war things changed.

Several things altered many of Guderian's pre and early war beliefs.  In 1942 Hitler put Germany on a wartime economy and war production went up considerably.  The Pz IV became better armed and armored, as well as the Tigers and Panthers were introduced.  This meant the German Army didn't have to have overwhelming numbers to have superiority on the battlefield.  It also became clear that the infantry indeed needed considerable armored support, which took the form of assault guns and tank destroyers, to succeed on an increasingly complex and deadly battlefield.  Though the problem of mobility, or even replacing all the horses with vehicles in the Infantry Divisions never happened because of a lack of productivity.  So basically Guderian's Pre-War Orthodoxy wasn't the Alpha-to-Omega of armored theories.  He had ignored one of the major rolls of the tank, to support infantry by providing them mobile, protected direct firepower on the battlefield.

Though these facts didn't effect the US Army's Armored Branch.  It didn't bother them for a long time because they had an enemy who had a lot of tanks to kill, the USSR.  They for a long time could pigeon-hole themselves into that very narrow mission.  And from the early 1980's on the US Army Infantry Branch was willing to let them.  They had long felt that tracked vehicles, no matter who's side they were on, where the 'enemy'.  So they went largely to 'light' infantry divisions, which were like previous infantry divisions, but with greatly reduced artillery, almost no transportation, very limited logistics and most importantly for them, NO TANKS!!!  Nor did the experience with Mounted Combat in Vietnam have any postiive effect on either Branch, nor their favorite 'platforms'.