Every once in a while I'll hear some commentator say that the 'way forward' in Iraq and Afghanistan or the way the US should only intervene in the future is to not send in a large mount of troops and instead stick with small 'attack' forces to grab bad guys and leave general security to the locals. And the locals can't then why bother is the second part. The problem with this is that it has already failed in a Real World situation. And bad, destine-to-fail-again ideas don't get better with age. It failed in Somalia.
For those who don't know there was a small UN peacekeeping/humanitarian relief mission in Somalia and in December 1992 lame-duck President G.H.W. Bush sent in a force of about 25,000 US troops (with allies as well, totalling 37,000 troops) into Somalia. This had the effect of suppressing the local Warlords enough to get food flowing again. The situation stayed about the same for the next 6 months until the US decided to pull all but 2600 troops out (part of the 28,000 troops and civilians). About 1200 of the remaining were designated as a Quick Reaction Force meant to back up the remaining foreign peacekeepers when they ran into trouble. The warlords, mainly Farah Aidid, started pushing back. The QRF was a total failure in it's role as it wasn't quick, couldn't react and the 1200 or so light infantry* soldiers lacked the combat power, ie 'force' necessary to carry out any mission other then guarding there own FOB.
In June 1993 twenty-four Pakistani Troops were captured and killed by Aidid supporters. This led to the US to attack Aidid's support structure, included AH-1 attacks in July on a building full of Aidid's clan members. The US lacked the willpower to deploy more troops to positively effect the security situation in Somalia and made the mistake of trying to used firepower to make up for the lack of manpower**. The attack on the Pakistanis also led to Adm. Howe to request for the force that became TF Ranger.
TF Ranger's failings was that it did nothing to help the average Somali, which lead to it's downfall. Repeated fly-overs, day and night irritated the population of Mogadishu. That irritation was turned to rage over time because TF Ranger did nothing about the awful security situation, lack of food and of basic services. That rage was finally manifested on Oct. 3rd and 4th 1993. And it's mission was flawed from the beginning. Taking out Aidid wouldn't have chanced much. The security vacuum would have led to other warlords fighting for what had been Aidid's fiefdom/organization. TF Ranger's mission, had it succeeded would have only had the desired effect if addition forces had been present and able fill the void left by Aidid's departure.
*The Reagan-Era Light Infantry Divisions lacked Armored Fighting Vehicles of any kind making them nearly combat ineffective. To the point were in Panama a mechanized battalion from the 5th Infantry Division using Vietnam Area M113A1s (not even the post-Vietnam A2 or the newest A3 introduced in 1987) and backed up with M551 Airborne tank/recon vehicles and Marine LAVs tackled the most difficult and dangerous task of going though Panama City and taking the PDF HQ, Noriega's seat of power. It showed that even using obsolescent equipment, a lighter weight mechanized force is more mobile and has much greater combat power then the 'light infantry' equivalent.
**More importantly properly equipped and resourced manpower. As manpower without firepower and mobility is as useless as firepower without manpower.
No comments:
Post a Comment